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THE IMPACT OF PRIVATISATION ON THE BANKING SECTOR
IN THE CARIBBEAN
I. Introduction
With the failure o f the import-substituting industrialisation policies o f the post­
war period, Caribbean countries shifted to an export-promotion strategy in the 1980s. 
Export promotion inevitably demanded a shifting o f the relative price and productivity of 
tradable goods and services. To provide the necessary incentives for export promotion, 
countries pursued a mixture o f reforms and restructuring to attract investment and to 
promote the competitiveness o f production and exchange. The period also coincided 
with a shift in the development paradigm of the developed countries and major 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). This new development strategy explicitly 
favoured open markets, a liberalised trading framework and a retreat o f the State from 
productive activity. In fact, the orthodoxy o f government failure became so entrenched 
that many economists argued that the State’s role should be confined to regulation and 
the provision o f infrastructure. As a result, the Welfare State, long championed in the 
post-war period, was deemed an anachronism. In Europe, in particular, the word 
‘sclerosis’ was borrowed from medicine to describe rigidities attributed to ‘overactive’ 
government intervention in economic activity and rigid, inflexible markets.
The new policy consensus, which was called the “Washington Consensus”, 
outlined a package o f market-oriented policies aimed at resuscitating flagging economies. 
Important components o f the package included price stability, fiscal prudence, trade 
openness through the reduction o f tariffs and elimination o f quotas, deregulation and 
privatisation o f State enterprises. Privatisation was established as a particularly crucial 
plank o f the reforms. This was so because it was believed that price incentives would be 
thwarted if  the State were allowed to burden the allocation o f resources by siphoning off 
finance to inefficient State-owned enterprises. Indeed, the evidence in many countries 
pointed to the crowding out o f productive private sector activity by heavy State 
borrowing on the domestic financial market.
This paper provides an analysis o f privatisation in the banking sector in the 
Caribbean and its impact on the performance o f the sector and economic growth. The 
study attempts to evaluate whether privatisation and liberalisation, in general, have led to 
significant gains in efficiency and profitability o f the sector and whether the depth o f the 
financial system has led to more productive allocation o f credit for investment and 
growth. Section II outlines the rationale that was used to recommend privatisation as an 
alternate strategy to State ownership o f productive activity. Section III o f the paper 
provides an overview o f the international experience with financial sector privatisation,
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while section IV gives the Caribbean experience. Section V is an evaluation o f the 
impact o f privatisation on the performance and growth in the banking sector. Meanwhile, 
Section VI looks at institutional restructuring and the significance o f the rising trend of 
mergers and acquisitions in the regional financial sector. Section VII underscores the 
importance o f strong prudential and regulatory standards and reform in this area. Section 
VIII examines the impact o f privatisation and liberalisation in the banking sector on 
economic growth. Finally Section IX concludes the paper with some policy 
recommendations.
II. Rationale for privatisation
At the height o f the so-called Washington Consensus, economists were so 
enamoured by the market, that privatisation was viewed as an end in itself. However, 
with empirical evidence showing that privatisation does not necessarily lead to higher 
growth rates, it is now seen more as a means to an end. The means being making markets 
more efficient and flexible in the allocation o f resources to promote the end o f stable and 
sustainable economic growth. A number o f policy considerations have provided the 
rationale for privatisation. At a broad level, privatisation was aimed at short-term 
macroeconomic stabilisation and adjustment and also longer-term structural 
transformation through improving supply-side efficiency.
In the Caribbean, like many other countries, the major short-term goal of 
privatisation was to rationalise and streamline public finances. Although this was not the 
case universally, the fact is that many State enterprises in the Caribbean had accumulated 
significant losses over time. This led to the diversion o f government resources to these 
enterprises to meet contingent liabilities. A number o f examples o f this abound, 
including the sugar industry in Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago and 
failed State commercial banks, such as the Workers Bank in Jamaica. Privatisation, it 
was believed, would not only reduce budgetary transfers to these State enterprises, but 
would also generate proceeds that could be used to finance alternative activities, 
especially production for export. In this context, privatisation assists in stabilisation by 
limiting fiscal deficits that could lead to inflation and by dampening the crowding out o f  
private investment, by reducing State demand for resources. In more recent times the 
efficiency aspect o f privatisation has been explained by two major principles - property 
rights and public choice theory. Property rights principle states that the State sector is 
inefficient in productive activity because no individual or group has a clear interest or 
stake in the assets o f the enterprise. As a result, bureaucrats operating a business 
enterprise would tend to produce inefficient, sub-optimal results. Public choice theory 
complements property rights theory - it argues that politicians and bureaucrats strive to 
maximise their institutional and individual self-interest and power rather than the wider 
public interest.1 The logical conclusion o f these theories is that the State should leave 
productive activity to the private sector.
1 See article by Paliwala, Abdul, (2000), “Privatisation in the Developing Countries: The Governance 
Issue,” in “Law, Social Justice & Global Development,” January.
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The more important long-term objective o f privatisation is to liberate supply-side 
constraints by providing incentives for investment and production by domestic and 
foreign investors. Privatisation was aimed at increasing factor accumulation in 
production, especially through foreign direct investment and also at improving 
productivity as incentives for innovation and research and development are unleashed. In 
this context, privatisation is promoted as a crucial factor in the process o f structural 
transformation by reducing the microeconomic inefficiencies and unlocking the 
productive potential o f enterprises. This should impact positively on growth and 
employment.
III. International experience of financial sector privatisation
With the return o f market fundamentalism in the 1980s, deregulation, 
liberalisation and privatisation were championed as necessary, though not sufficient, 
conditions for growth. At the international level, the financial sector was viewed as a 
prime candidate for liberalisation and privatisation, as by its very nature, competitive 
forces were needed to guarantee banking sector efficiency. Theory was partly supported 
by practical evidence o f many unprofitable and poorly run State-owned banks and other 
financial institutions. Despite its difficulties, however, the financial sector activities were 
relatively more profitable than other activities and this made it easier for governments to 
find buyers or shareholders in the private sector. Importantly, liberalisation and 
globalisation o f the financial sector, driven largely by information technology, 
undermined public ownership o f financial institutions. A number o f State-owned 
financial institutions simply could not cope with the competition in the areas o f product 
innovation, customer service, technical productivity and managerial competence.
Major sales o f financial institutions have taken place in both developed and 
developing countries. Developed countries set the stage for major privatisation in the 
financial and other economic sectors as they were the first group o f countries to shift to 
free market policies. Privatised government-owned financial enterprises included the 
Bayerischer Versicherungs in Germany2 in 1995with sale proceeds o f around US$1740 
million. In Italy, the INA 2 bank was privatised and realised sales o f US$1000 million 
made through a public offer and the Nordebanken bank in Sweden, which offered public 
shares that amounted to US$893 million.
Developing countries also pursued financial sector liberalisation and privatisation 
often under the auspices o f the IFIs as part o f the conditions for securing loan financing. 
In any event, a number o f countries had already learned the demerits o f public ownership 
of banks the hard way. Inefficient operations and banking failures were enough 
testimony o f the demerits o f State ownership o f banks in many countries. In fact, in 
many developing countries, the issue was not whether financial sector privatisation was 
necessary, but the sequencing and mode o f such privatisation in order to maximise the
2See article- Kain, John, “International Privatisation Perspectives: 1995-96, Australian Parliamentary 
Library.
4
benefits from the process. In India, the State-owned Industrial Development Bank of 
India (IDBI) was sold in 1995 for US$758 million through a public offer.
Latin American countries, with the exception o f Mexico and Chile, did not start to 
privatise banks until the early 1990s. Chile was the forerunner and had privatised 19 of 
20 State-owned banks by 1973. However, the initial phase o f privatisation in Chile led to 
a financial crisis, as the prudential and regulatory framework was ill-suited to the fairly 
rapid liberalisation. This led to renationalisation and eventually to a second wave of 
privatisation that was more successful. Mexico introduced a programme of deregulation 
and financial liberalisation by the late 1980s. However, privatisation o f commercial 
banks was undermined by weak prudential and regulatory standards, which contributed to 
a financial crisis in 1994. Argentina, like other Latin American countries, was affected by 
banking sector problems, including the low mobilisation o f deposits, and non-performing 
loans provided the impetus to privatisation. Privatisation was so widespread that by 
2000, State-owned banks had declined to 15 from 40 in 1990. In Brazil also, the 
government continues to privatise State-owned banks. In 2000, two large regional banks, 
Banestado and Banespa were privatised. Meanwhile, in Peru, Banco Continental made a 
public offering o f shares amounting to US$256 million in 1995.
Even in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), a number o f financial reforms 
and liberalisation policies were undertaken aimed at deepening the financial sector and 
increasing available resources for investment (Brownbridge and Gayi, 1997). Almost all 
of the LDCs have allowed the entry o f new private sector banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. To strengthen prudential standards, however, a number o f these countries 
raised minimum capital requirements, improved legislation and the expertise o f managers 
to enhance the solvency and performance o f the banking sector.
Financial liberalisation and privatisation have had varied effects on countries, 
depending on the stage o f development, the consistency o f the reforms and the 
institutional capacity to transform finance into viable and productive investment. In most 
of the Asian developing countries, increased private sector participation in the financial 
sector was associated with greater financial depth, measured by growth in bank deposits 
and broad money supply (M2) to GDP3. This was because many o f these countries had 
attained macroeconomic stability, which provided a platform for growth in the financial 
sector. In Bangladesh and Nepal, for instance, bank deposits grew by around 8 
percentage points o f GDP between 1985 and 1995. Financial depth improved in some 
African countries, such as Botswana and Uganda, but weakened in others, including 
Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi. The worsening situation in some o f these countries, in 
any event, stemmed not from purely financial difficulties, but from macroeconomic 
instability, particularly high inflation and public sector deficits, and political instability in 
others.
3 See Brownbridge, Martin and Gayi, Samuel K. (1997), “Progress, Constraints and Limitations of the 
Financial Sector Reforms in the Least Developed Countries, IMF.
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The financial system in the Caribbean evolved primarily to facilitate international 
trade and commerce. In colonial times, branches o f international banks, such as Barclays 
and Citicorp, were set up in the region to provide finance for production and export of 
commodities, such as sugar, bananas, rum, bauxite and petroleum. These banks provided 
relatively basic intermediary services, such as loans, lines o f credit, export credit and 
overdraft facilities.
Similar to the current trend, international banks o f this era operated consolidated 
balance sheets and viewed the Caribbean as a small part o f their global operations. The 
banks established strategic networks with the objective o f maximising profits, market 
share and shareholder returns. In fact, there was no real commitment to the development 
of the region, and banking activity coincided with opportunities to make profits and to 
export capital. A reflection o f this was that foreign banking activity was particularly pro­
cyclical. Export booms and improving terms o f trade coincided with increased sector 
investment and lending, while recessions or declining commodity prices led to poor 
profitability and reduced investment in the local economy.
Moreover, the market structure under which they operated was strongly 
oligopolistic, providing ample opportunity for banks to capture rent, in spite of 
widespread inefficiencies in the intermediation process. This was indicative o f a small 
number o f players in the market, substantial pre-emptive competitive advantages and 
poor mechanisms for government regulation and control in the public interest. 
Furthermore, banks operated more or less as a cartel, colluding in the setting o f interest 
rates and other terms o f credit. With limited competition and virtually no regulatory 
machinery in place, banks were able to make significant profits on account o f the large 
interest rate spreads and the payment o f relatively low wages and salaries.
In the post-independence period, in an effort to meet the “legitimate expectations” 
of the population for a greater share o f the economic pie, governments moved to 
nationalise a number o f industries, including banks. A classic case o f nationalisation 
occurred under the Manley Government in Jamaica in the 1970s. Following the failure of 
liberal policies to bridge the equity gap and to promote balanced growth, government 
decided to take control o f the ‘commanding heights’ o f the economy. Nationalisation was 
also driven by the imminent closure o f private enterprises that felt threatened by the 
socialist policies o f the Manley Government. Nationalised enterprises included factories, 
farms, hotels, utilities and banks. By 1980, the State sector owned 50 per cent o f hotel 
room capacity, 8 out o f 12 sugar factories and the State Trading Corporation, which was 
established to regulate the importation o f goods.4
The Jamaican Government nationalised Barclays Bank in 1977 and renamed it the 
National Commercial Bank o f Jamaica. Similarly, in Guyana the Burnham Government 
acquired a number o f enterprises in virtually all sectors o f the economy, including sugar,
IV. Privatisation experiences in the Caribbean banking sector
4 See Mistry, Percy et al, (1992) “Adjusting Privatization: Case studies from Developing Countries”, 
Heinemann Publishers
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bauxite, distribution, manufacturing and banking. Most o f the foreign-owned banks 
operating in Guyana at the time, including Chase Manhattan, Barclays and Royal Bank of 
Canada, were nationalised.
By the early 1980s, the pendulum had swung back in favour o f liberal market 
policies. In recognition o f the limitations o f the State-dominated approach to 
development, in general, and the glaring inefficiencies o f State-owned commercial banks, 
in particular, a number o f Caribbean countries were prompted to privatise a number of 
State-owned banks. This formed part o f the broader programme of financial 
liberalisation.5 This has, in many cases, been complemented by measures aimed at 
liberalising interest rates, directed lending as well as barriers to entry into the banking 
system and eventually liberalising the capital account o f the balance o f payments. The 
overarching and long-term objective has been to increase efficiency o f State-owned 
banks so as to match the demands o f an increasingly complex and sophisticated financial 
system. All these measures are necessary if  privatised State-owned banks are to become 
more efficient, profitable and competitive.
More than 36 State-owned banks were privatised by 1995 with total assets 
amounting to more that US$8 billion [Clarke 1997]. This represented approximately three 
quarters o f total commercial banks' assets. As can be seen from Table1 the countries with 
the highest number o f banking privatisation were Guyana and Jamaica. This is not 
surprising since these countries implemented socialist policies after independence, which 
gave the State a pervasive role in virtually all the sectors o f the economy, including the 
financial sector. Guyana started to privatise commercial banks as early as 1985 with the 
privatisation o f one o f the largest banks - the Guyana Bank for Trade and Industry 
(GBTI) - through private and public share offer. Only 35 per cent o f the bank's shares 
were offered for sale. The second phase o f privatisation was in 1991 when the bank was 
privatised through public subscription o f 70 per cent o f shares with the government 
retaining the remaining 30 per cent.
With the change in government in 1992, privatisation came to a complete halt 
because it was felt that there was no clearly defined or articulated strategy for 
privatisation. After tabling legislation with revised objectives and guidelines for 
privatisation, the Government o f Cheddi Jagan resumed bank privatisation in 1994 with 
further divestment o f the Guyana Bank o f Trade and Industry through a public tender 
offer o f 29.6 per cent shares, which was procured by one shareholder. The remaining 
share o f the government in the National Bank for Industry and Commerce (NBIC) was to 
be divested completely in 1996. Apart from this, efforts are also under way in Guyana to 
privatise the Guyana National Co-operative Bank (GNCB), the only remaining State- 
owned bank in the country. Privatisation o f that bank has proven difficult for the 
government compared to the privatisation o f the other two banks, NBIC and GBTI. This
5 Financial liberalisation in developing countries was influenced by the writing of McKinnon and Shaw and 
was based on the recognition that that the repressed nature of the financial sector impeded the efficient 
intermediation of financial capital between surplus and deficit entities. In fact, financial repression was 
viewed as an effective tax on financial intermediation.
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is due largely to the weak financial position o f the bank and poor loan portfolio. For 
example, the non-performing loan is estimated at 91 per cent o f total loans. In the 
meantime, the bank has been placed under a management consultant whose responsibility 
is to prepare it for privatisation. A number o f measures have been put in place to clean 
the balance sheet o f the bank so as to increase its attractiveness to prospective investors. 
Credit extension is being controlled and attempts are being made to recover the non­
performing loans.
Jamaica has had perhaps one o f the longest record o f privatisation in the English­
speaking Caribbean, spanning several decades. Jamaica's privatisation o f State-owned 
banks started as early as 1986 under the Seaga Administration with the privatisation of 
the National Commercial Bank (NCB) o f Jamaica. The mode o f privatisation was public 
placement through the Jamaican Stock Exchange (JSE) whereby 51 per cent of 
government's shares/equity in NCB was divested. Under phase II o f privatisation the 
government further reduced its shares in NCB by selling more than six million shares to 
the NCB Trust and Merchant Bank, which was the trustee o f the NCB employee share 
scheme (Bernal and Leslie, 1999). The remaining 49 per cent o f government's shares in 
NCB, which was initially planned to be divested through public share offer, were sold 
through private placement in 1993, during phase III o f privatisation. Another bank, the 
Workers Savings and Loan Bank, was also privatised in early 1991, through public 
placement on the Jamaican Stock Exchange.
The watershed o f the privatisation thrust in Trinidad and Tobago was the 
establishment o f the “State Enterprises Committee” by the National Alliance for 
Reconstruction (NAR) Government in 1986. Privatisation was a part o f the response to 
financial and economic difficulties o f the period. The objectives o f privatisation included 
the freeing-up o f resources for government, enhancing efficiency through greater private 
sector initiative and competition and creating opportunities for employees to own shares 
in enterprises through share options.
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Table 1: Caribbean commercial banks privatised since the mid-1980s




M ode of 
privatisation
The Bahamas Bank of Bahamas 1994 and
1995
Private placement 
49% of shares 
Government retained 51%
Guyana Guyana Bank for 
Trade and Industry
1991 Public Subscription 
70% shares
Government retained 30%
Guyana Bank for 
Trade and Industry
1994
Public tender offer 29% 
procured by one shareholder 
Government' shares 
divested.




Public and private share 
offer 35% of Bank's share 
plus new share offering. 
Government retained 30% 
plus 17.5 % NIS
Public tender offer.




Jamaica National Commercial 
Bank of Jamaica
1993 Private placements 49 % 
divested by bank.





through Jamaican Stock 
Exchange,
51 % divested by 
Government.
Workers Savings and 
Loan Bank (WSLB) 1991 Privatised through JSE
OECS National Commercial 
Bank of Grenada
Grenada Bank of 
Commerce
National Commercial 




90 per cent sale of shares.
Private and public 
Placement of shares.
Public subscription of 
Shares.
Source: Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies, April 1997
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In the banking sector, the privatisation o f the National Commercial Bank (NCB) 
was an important turning point. Government acquired the dominant share in what became 
NCB, from the Bank o f London and Montreal in 1970. Ironically, NCB was not 
privatised because o f performance failures, as it was profitable, even during the economic 
slump of the 1980s. The privatisation o f NCB signalled the influence o f the sweeping 
shift in economic thought in favour o f private sector led development. This school of 
thought was particularly against State ownership o f commercial banks, which were 
deemed to be cardinal private sector institutions. In addition, government policy 
favoured privatisation as a mechanism for transferring equity to the citizens o f Trinidad 
and Tobago. In fact, in 1988 when government shareholding in NCB fell below 50 per 
cent, 20 per cent (1,580,996 shares) were transferred from the government to set up an 
employee share acquisition scheme. The proportionate allocation o f shares reflected the 
high priority given to employees and small investors.
Unlike Guyana and Jamaica, bank privatisation has not been a major component 
of financial sector reform in the smaller Caribbean countries o f the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Bahamas since these countries did not have 
significant numbers o f State-owned commercial banks. The only two exceptions in the 
OECS were Grenada and Saint Lucia. The Government o f Grenada divested 90 per cent 
of its shares in the National Commercial Bank o f Grenada in 1992 through private 
placement. The majority o f shares were acquired by the Republic Bank o f Trinidad and 
Tobago while 10 per cent went to Grenadians. Apart from the privatisation o f NCB 
Grenada, the Government o f Grenada began reducing its shares in the Grenada Bank of 
Commerce (GBC) when it sold 15 per cent o f its shares to the National Insurance Scheme 
in December 1996. Government shareholding was further reduced when the Royal Bank 
of Trinidad and Tobago (RBTT) purchased 50 per cent in the GBC in June o f 1997. By 
2000, government share holding was reduced to only 10 per cent with the Caribbean 
Banking Corporation Limited (the parent company o f RBTT) holding the majority shares 
of 62 per cent. The remainder is held by the National Insurance Scheme (15 per cent) and 
by the public o f Grenada (13 per cent).
In July 1999, the Saint Lucian Government divested its shares in the National 
Commercial Bank and the Saint Lucia Development Bank through subscription o f public 
offering. The two banks have merged to form the Bank o f Saint Lucia which now 
provides a range o f financial services, such as mortgage finance, offshore finance, 
property and real estate and insurance services.
In the Bahamas, the government privatised the Bank o f Bahamas in two phases, 
first in 1994 and again in 1995. The mode o f divestment was through private placement 
of 49 per cent o f shares with the government retaining 51 per cent o f shares in the Bank.
As far as the mode o f privatisation o f commercial banks in the Caribbean is 
concerned, notable differences have been observed in the modality o f divestment in the 
1980s and early 1990s and the more recent waves o f privatisation. Whilst the first phase 
of privatisation was characterised by public offering through stock exchanges, the more 
recent phases o f bank privatisation, however, have been done either through private
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placements or private tenders. The change in the mode o f privatisation probably partly 
reflected the stagnant organic growth in regional stock/capital markets with little 
secondary trading and also increased interest by private tenders as banks became more 
viable. Therefore, the absorptive capacity o f these equity markets for newly divested 
firms remained small. Most o f the privatised banks have been sold to domestic buyers, 
both individuals and corporate. The only exception are the privatisations o f the NCB of 
Grenada as well as the Grenada Bank o f Commerce, which were sold to regional 
investors - the Republic Bank o f Trinidad and Tobago and the Royal Bank o f Trinidad 
and Tobago, respectively. Privatisation o f State assets through public share offers on 
capital markets, especially stock exchanges, has also been a popular mode o f bank 
privatisation in the Caribbean. With regard to public share sales in the Caribbean, it was 
common to allocate shares to employees and managers o f the privatised State-owned 
banks, often on preferential terms. This was the case with the privatisation o f Workers 
Savings and Loan Bank o f Jamaica as well as the Grenada Bank o f Commerce. This 
provides a mechanism through which citizens could gain a stake in the patrimony o f their 
countries and earn income.
V. Impact of privatisation on banking sector performance
Assessing the impact o f privatisation on banking sector performance is inherently 
problematic since it is difficult to isolate privatisation specific factors from other factors 
that may equally have had an impact on the banking sector. Apart from bank 
privatisation, the liberalisation o f interest rates and removal o f credit ceilings and directed 
lending, which formed an integral part o f many World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) financial sector reform programmes implemented in the Caribbean may have 
also impacted on banking sector performance. Other measures complementing banking 
privatisation, such as the implementation o f the Uruguay Round commitments in the 
financial services sector in accordance with the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)6, may have had an effect on banking sector performance and profitability. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, an attempt will be made to draw some inferences on 
the effect o f privatisation on the banking sector in the Caribbean.
The impact o f privatisation on the banking sector and on individual banks’ 
performance has varied across countries and among banks, obviously depending on, 
among other factors, management, regulatory and supervisory structures, degree of 
competition and the differences in the way the banks have responded to competitive 
pressure. In general, it seems that bank privatisation has had a significantly positive 
impact on individual privatised banks and, by extension, on the banking sector as a 
whole. The growth in the size o f the banking sector as measured by assets and liabilities 
of individual privatised banks and the banking sector, as a whole, has been phenomenal.
6 A number of Caribbean countries have undertaken market access commitments in many subsectors of 
financial services including insurance and banking (See ECLAC/CDCC, "Progress made by the Caribbean 
countries in the WTO built-in Agenda on Services and Intellectual Property Rights", LC/CAR/G.648), June 
2001.
11
However, care must be exercised when interpreting figures on banks' assets and liabilities 
since, as indicated in Section II, most State-owned banks were profitable and did 
experience robust growth in assets and liabilities prior to privatisation. The National 
Commercial Bank o f Jamaica, for example, experienced rapid growth in the period before 
privatisation. Its assets and deposits grew from J$1,101.0 million in 1982 to more than 
J$3,247.0 million in 1986. Total deposits and loans have also grown considerably by 
152.4 per cent and 135.3 per cent, respectively, from 1982 to 1986. It remained profitable 
during the 1980s recording an after tax profit o f J$17.5 million in 1986 compared to only 
J$9.1 million in 1982. However, its assets and liabilities grew even more robustly in the 
post privatisation period, especially during the first half o f the 1990s (See Annex, Figure 
1). The Workers Savings and Loan Bank also experienced significant growth in assets, 
deposits and profitability especially in the first five years since privatisation. However, 
performance o f the bank has deteriorated since 1996, and has subsequently been taken 
over by Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) (See Annex, Figure 2). The 
National Commercial Bank o f Grenada has experienced the fastest growth in assets and 
deposits o f all the banks surveyed in this study. Total assets grew from EC$127.7 million 
in 1990 to EC$417.7 million in 2000. Deposits and advances grew considerably from 
EC$109.2 and EC$88.7 million in 1990 to EC$373.1 million and EC$268 million in 
2000, respectively. This was similarly the case with banks in Guyana, especially NIBC 
and GBTI (See Annex, Figures 4 and  5). Privatisation and deregulation may have opened 
up unprecedented opportunities for banks to engage in all types o f activities and a wider 
range o f services. The removal o f foreign exchange controls has made it possible for 
banks to offer foreign currency accounts. A number o f banks in Jamaica, for example, 
operate cambios. This in turn has led to considerable increase in banks’ assets and 
liabilities.
Perhaps, the most significant impact o f privatisation on commercial banks in the 
Caribbean has been in the area o f customer service and product innovation. Most o f the 
banks that have been privatised indicate that there has been a considerable improvement 
in customer service. This has been reflected in better range o f products and services to 
customers. Many banks have now introduced efficient delivery channels, such as 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), debit cards and some are now in the process of 
introducing internet and electronic banking. All o f these have been made possible by the 
rapid development in information technology. Customer service has become increasingly 
the main area in which banks in the region compete. The collusive behaviour o f banks in 
determining interest rates as well as the lack o f product differentiation have forced the 
banks to improve their customer service significantly.
As indicated earlier, one o f the main reasons for banking privatisation was the 
need to enhance competition and efficiency in the banking sector. Liberalisation and 
deregulation o f the banking sector were expected to lead to competition in the sector. 
Competition would have come from the mere increase in the number o f banking 
institutions as well as non-bank financial institutions competing for both deposit and 
lending. However, there has not been a significant increase in the number o f banking 
institutions in the Caribbean, with the exception o f Jamaica, especially in the first half of 
the 1990s. In the latter, the number o f financial institutions grew from 36 in the 1980s to
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more than 57 in 1996. However, these have decreased considerably since 1996 as a result 
of restructuring o f failed financial institutions by FINSAC. The number o f commercial 
banks grew from eight in 1980 to 12 in 1995. In Guyana only two new banks have 
entered the market. The removal o f the interest rate ceiling especially on deposit and the 
lifting o f prohibitions on interest payments on demand deposit may have spurred 
competition in the sector by reducing sources o f cheap funding for banks.
However, increased competition has not been reflected in a decline in 
concentration ratios, especially in Jamaica. The percentage share o f the two largest banks 
in total assets has increased considerably from 69.9 per cent in 1990 to 76.0 per cent in 
1999. It seems that the largest two banks have consolidated their entrenched dominance 
of the market. Further analysis reveals that the substantial increase in concentration 
ratios reflects consolidation and mergers and acquisitions that have been taking place in 
the financial sector as a result o f restructuring.
Figure 1: Concentration ratios - Jamaica 
(Shares of two largest banks in total assets)
In Guyana, on the other hand, the concentration ratios have declined steadily from 
around 85.0 per cent in 1995 to 68.9 per cent in 2000. The significant decrease in 
concentration ratios is partly attributed to the weak assets growth o f one o f the three 
largest banks, Guyana National Co-operative Bank, which remains the only State-owned 
bank in Guyana. To illustrate the point, total assets o f the banking industry, as a whole, 
grew by an average 11.3 per cent during the period 1995-2000. Total assets o f the 
Guyana National Co-operative Bank, however, grew by a mere 1.4 per cent during the 
period under review. The assets o f the other smaller banks, most notably Bank o f Nova 
Scotia and Demerara Bank, have grown much faster by 264.7 per cent and 364.8 per cent, 
respectively. This points to some degree o f competition and penetration taking place in 
the banking industry.
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Figure 2: Concentration ratios -  Guyana 
(Shares of two largest banks in total assets)
Competition in the banking industry has been non-price, mainly advertising, 
quality improvement, product packaging and services. This is due to the oligopolistic 
nature o f the banking industry in the region where banks collude in determining interest 
rates. This has resulted in very high interest rate margins, defined as the spread between 
lending and deposit rates. Commercial banks in Jamaica enjoy the highest interest 
margins in the region. As can be seen from Figure 3, interest rate margins increased from 
21.6 per cent in 1991 to reach a high o f 43.15 per cent in 1993 but have since then 
steadily declined to 21.81 per cent in 2000. Interest rate margins in Guyana, although 
much lower than in Jamaica, have increased steadily from 7.32 per cent in 1991 to 9.93 
per cent in 2000. The high interest margins in Jamaica could partly be explained by the 
high inflation period. Tight monetary policy, including high reserve requirements, which 
was pursued in the 1990s also contributed to high interest rate margins.
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Figure 3: Commercial banks interest rate margins
Another apparent reason for the high interest margins is the high operating cost 
and high percentage o f non-performing loans. In Guyana for example, the NBIC has 
recorded an increase in non-interest expenses as a percentage o f total assets, which 
moved from 4.74 per cent in 1995 to 5.35 per cent in 2000. Similar increases have also 
been reported for the GBTI, with non-interest expenses increasing from 4.13 per cent in 
1995 to 5.24 per cent in 2000. NBIC's provision for loan losses grew from 0.66 per cent 
in 1995 to 2.33 per cent in 2000. This has had a negative impact on the bank's 
profitability. For example, NBIC's profit before tax declined from 2.15 per cent in 1995 
to 1.08 per cent in 2000. Similarly, GBTI's profitability has declined from 1.96 to 0.57 
per cent from 1995 to 2000, respectively. The NCB, Grenada, on the other hand has 
performed better than all the other banks surveyed in this paper. Better performance has 
been reflected in improvement in profitability while better management o f credit risk 
seemed to have contributed to the decrease in non-performing loans.
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Table 2: Banking sector performance 
(Per cent of total assets)
Guyana NBIC GBTI
Net interest income 
Loans losses 
Profit before tax 
Non interest expense 
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Source: Calculated from Annual Reports of various Commercial Banks
Notes: NBIC refers to National Bank of Industry and Commerce of Guyana and GBTI denotes the 
Guyana Bank for Trade and Industry.
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Banks in Jamaica suffered huge losses in the late 1990s on account o f the 
financial crisis. High percentage o f non-performing loans and large operating costs, 
especially compensation packages paid to Executives7, point to significant inefficiencies 
in the banking industry. The National Commercial Bank o f Jamaica experienced marked 
deterioration in the rate o f return on assets (ROA) and the rate o f return on equity (ROE) 
during the second half o f the 1990s. As a result, the bank profitability was compromised 
(See Table 2).
Although financial liberalisation, including privatisation, has contributed to better 
portfolio management o f commercial banks in some countries, it has also led to banking 
or broader financial crises in others. This has been particularly the case in Jamaica. 
Although the Jamaican crisis cannot be attributed entirely to liberalisation, such reforms 
may have exacerbated problems in the financial sector, especially in the face of 
prudential and macroeconomic weaknesses.8 The accelerated liberalisation o f the 
economy coupled with deregulation led to rapid growth in the financial sector, both in 
terms o f assets and liabilities o f financial institutions as well as the number o f new 
financial institutions that entered the market. For example, the number o f financial 
institutions reached a high 57 with total assets o f more than J$192.6 billion in 1996 
compared to only 36 institutions with assets totalling J$2.5 billion in 1980. The number 
of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) also grew substantially during this period. In 
fact, the Jamaican banking sector became over-banked. All these institutions started to 
compete fiercely against one another for a narrow segment o f the market. In response to 
new opportunities created and increased competition, banks started to offer high interest 
rates to attract depositors and in turn using the proceeds to expand lending and engage in 
more risky activities. 9 The banks aggressively expanded loans without paying sufficient 
attention to internal supervisory measures. There was not proper accounting for non­
performing loans.10 To make matters worse, the prudential and regulatory infrastructures 
were not equipped to deal with the challenges o f an emerging and competitive industry. 
Poor planning, improper risk assessment, mismatching o f assets and liabilities and 
connected lending contributed to weak loan portfolios. Many indigenous financial 
institutions faced a high percentage o f non-performing loans, high interest rates and 
ultimately a liquidity crisis.11 However, the foreign-owned banks remained profitable and
7 For example, the ratio of employee remuneration to average assets for the commercial banks averaged 3.3 
per cent in the first half of the 1990s, far exceeding the United States benchmark of 2.0 per cent (Bank of 
Jamaica, April-June 2001).
8 Financial liberalisation in other Latin American countries, most notably Argentina, Chile and Brazil, in 
the 1970s has also ended in both banking and broader financial crisis.
9 Some banks started to engage in foreign exchange trading and other range of securities while others 
acquired real estate and insurance companies.
10 For, example, many indigenous banks used 180 days period before recognising a loan as non performing 
in contrast to an international norm of 90 days.
11 Some people have argued that the financial crisis was inevitable since the banking sector was over­
banked. In other words the large number of financial institutions was not justified by the small size of the
economy.
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liquid during the same period. What explains the resilience o f the foreign banks to the 
financial crisis has been better management and effective internal supervisory and 
regulatory standards.
To safeguard the vitality o f the financial system the Jamaican Government 
established FINSAC12 to recapitalise and strengthen the insurance and banking 
institutions affected by the crisis. The two banks, NCB and Workers Savings and Loan 
Bank (WSLB), which were privatised at the turn o f the 1990s, have had to be taken over 
by FINSAC. As a result o f consolidation in the banking industry, the number of 
commercial banks which has grown to 13 in the early and mid-1990s has now declined to 
only five.
VI. The impact of banking sector privatisation on economic growth
Privatisation and liberalisation, like other market-opening policies, should not be 
viewed as ends in themselves, but means to the end o f stable, sustainable and equitable 
growth, and development. The transmission process through which privatisation in the 
banking sector impacts on growth is multifaceted. Moreover, in many instances the 
process does not entail uniform cause and effect, but tradeoffs. Therefore, the net effect 
depends on which o f a number o f processes predominate.
As financial institutions act as intermediaries, transferring resources from surplus 
economic units to deficit units, they hold the potential to impact on capital accumulation 
and total factor productivity. For a long time, Caribbean financial institutions have 
focused on mobilising larger amounts o f finance, rather than the efficiency with which 
these funds are used. This has led to the over-supply o f funding to certain sectors o f high 
preference, such as distribution, real estate, mortgages and consumables, while other vital 
sectors, notably agriculture and small enterprises have faced a severe shortage of 
financial resources.
An important question is to what extent have privatisation and other liberalisation 
measures in the financial sector provided a stimulus to stable growth? To assess the 
impact o f privatisation o f the banking sector on growth we first need to examine how the 
sector enhances its productivity and efficiency, and how this is transmitted to
improvements in growth in the productive sectors o f the economy. Generally, as an
economy grows and develops, the banking sector becomes more specialised,
sophisticated and cost-effective.13 This increasing financial depth and efficiency has a
positive feedback on capital accumulation, productivity and growth. It must be noted, 
however, that even though this has been the pattern in developed countries, it is often not 
replicated to a similar extent or intensity in developing countries. Indeed, the impact of
12 FINSAC stands for Financial Sector Adjustment Company.
13 See Harrison, Sussman and Zeira, “Finance and Growth: Theory and New Evidence”, Federal Reserve 
Board, Washington, DC, July, 1999.
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liberalisation o f the banking sector on growth depends on a number o f factors, including 
the competition in the sector, concentration, the demand for and direction o f credit, the 
efficiency o f investment, among others. This makes it difficult to determine with any 
precision how these market-driven policies affect financial development.
Generally, though, the evidence in the Caribbean suggests that privatisation and 
liberalisation have led to improvements in the efficiency o f the banking sector in terms of 
reduced operating costs and higher profit margins, but the impact on growth in output has 
not been that favourable. This stems to a large extent from certain structural constraints 
that confront the Caribbean banking sector. Important among these impediments is the 
small size o f the regional market and also o f the banks themselves. With the exception of 
a few large regional banks, such as RBTT and The Republic Bank o f Trinidad and 
Tobago, size constraint means that regional banks benefit significantly less from 
economies o f scale and scope than their counterparts in developed countries.
One important means through which liberalisation and privatisation o f the 
financial sector is expected to contribute to growth is through ‘financial deepening.’ 
Financial deepening refers to increasing the depth and range o f the financial system so as 
to provide more resources for intermediation and investment. A crucial avenue for 
enhancing the depth o f the financial system is by eliminating interest rate repression, by 
liberalising controlled interest rates.14 This strengthens the incentive o f households to 
save in the banking system, rather than hold real assets. Apart from price incentives 
through interest rates, non-price competition instruments, such as advertising, customer 
service and convenience, also provide strong inducements to savings mobilisation.
Two basic measures o f the impact o f privatisation and other reforms on financial 
depth are growth in bank deposits and broad money, M2 as a percentage o f GDP. As 
indicated earlier, privatisation has generally led to solid growth in banks’ deposit 
liabilities. Growth in the money supply tends to have a positive impact on growth in real 
output largely through its impact on interest rates. An expansion o f the money supply 
through purchase o f bonds by the central banks leaves the commercial banks with excess 
reserves. To expand their lending to gain profits, commercial banks lower their loan rates 
of interests. This decrease in interest rates positively affects interest sensitive investment 
in areas manufacturing and housing construction.
The ratio o f broad money supply (M2) to GDP seems to have been positively 
affected by banking sector privatisation and liberalisation. However, it is crucial to note 
that monetary policy, especially the use o f open market operations and adjustments in the 
central banks’ discount rates, also affected growth in money supply. Guyana is somewhat 
different from Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in that financial deepening measured by 
M2/GDP was badly affected by the slump in growth in the 1980s. This was reflected in 
particularly high ratios, as high as 114.38 per cent in 1988. In the 1990s, in the wake of 
reforms and restructuring, growth picked up in Guyana and this led to a reduction o f the
14 Interest rate repression refers to financial sector interest rates that are below market rates and which 
therefore fail to provide a good incentive to saving and investing.
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ratios. However, the impact o f banking sector privatisation on GDP seems to have set in 
by the latter part o f the 1990s, when the ratio o f M2/GDP steadily increased from about 
59.5 per cent in 1995 to 79.9 per cent in 1999.
Although the trend in M2/GDP for Jamaica has fluctuated over time, there has 
been a noticeable upward movement since 1995. In 1996, the ratio fell to 40.9 per cent in 
the wake o f the financial crisis in the country, but has increased to 46.2 per cent by 2000. 
This suggests that FINSAC and privatisation have renewed confidence in the sector. 
Meanwhile in Trinidad and Tobago, there has also been steady financial deepening from 
the latter part o f the1980s and into the 1990s. Improved growth in GDP might have had a 
positive impact on growth in the money supply and vice versa over the period o f the mid 
to latter part o f the 1990s in particular. Growth in the money supply seems to have 
provided financial institutions with a greater pool o f funds for debt-intermediation. This 
might have had a positive impact on the coefficient o f transformation o f financial 
resources into physical capital.15
Figure 4: Broad Money M2 as a percentage of GDP 
for selected Caribbean countries
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15 See Shaw, Edward, “Financial Deepening in Economic Development,” Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1973.
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Figure 5: Broad money supply as a percentage of GDP
for selected Caribbean countries 1991-2000
The difference in the growth effect o f privatisation and liberalisation, which has 
led to increased financial depth in the Caribbean, relates importantly to differences in 
market structure and competition. Whereas banks in the United States and Europe 
operate in relative strong, monopolistically competitive markets with each bank being 
able to influence lending costs and conditions in its sphere o f influence, in the Caribbean, 
the market structure is less competitive and although monopolistically competitive is 
nearer to oligopoly. As Worrel16 has noted, the widespread observance o f oligopolistic 
behaviour o f financial institutions means that competitive models o f bank behaviour are 
inappropriate. Market power gives large Caribbean banks more scope for influencing the 
cost and terms o f credit than their developed country counterparts. Therefore, regional 
banks have greater scope for making supernormal profits, thereby reducing consumer 
welfare and restricting the growth impact o f their largely consumer-based lending. This 
is supported by the relatively high interest rate spreads17 in the region.
Privatisation and liberalisation have led to more market-based instruments for 
determining the allocation o f funds. Generally, interest rates have been liberated, 
selected credit controls eliminated and State directed credit drastically reduced. These 
price-based incentives have provided wider latitude for firms to make profits. The profit 
motive and incentive have acted as strong forces to allocate funds to sectors, such as real 
estate and distribution, which hold the potential for quick returns on assets. As is 
expected, this is a rational choice by bankers. However, the corollary to this process has 
been the neglect o f adequate financing for important activities that holds great potential 
for boosting growth and creating employment.
16 See Worrel, Delisle, “Bank Behaviour in Small Open Economies”, Central Bank of Barbados, October, 
1996.
17 The interest rate spread is the difference between the deposit rates of interest and the loan rates.
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Of signal importance, is the fact that privatisation has not led to any major break­
through in the provision o f equity finance for green-field investments. What this means 
is that new entrepreneurs, inventors and innovators lack adequate capital to carry through 
their plans. By contrast, in the United States and Europe, privatisation and liberalisation 
of the banking sector led to a mushrooming o f equity, merchant banks and other term 
finance institutions to provide the long-term growth capital requirements o f these 
countries. But in the Caribbean, as a whole, the unlocking o f market incentives has led 
largely to burgeoning retail banking and attendant innovations in this area o f relatively 
short-term financing. Moreover, the significant risk aversion o f the regional commercial 
banking sector persists in the post-liberalisation period. Therefore, one finds the major 
anomaly o f a significant portfolio in real estate that is profoundly risky, but little term 
finance for potentially viable projects in agriculture and small-scale manufacturing.
VII. Institutional restructuring and mergers and acquisitions
A decade ago, there was very little foray into the regional financial market by 
banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions in the Caribbean. Financial 
institutions were at a relatively nascent stage in their development. Consequently, they 
lacked the requisite economies o f scale, technical and managerial competence to establish 
successfully in the regional market. Moreover, the market and institutional barriers to the 
free movement o f capital compounded weaknesses at the level o f the firm. Important 
among the constraints to the free movement o f capital was State domination o f some 
banks and a reluctance to accede to regional participation by a number o f privately owned 
financial institutions. With increased global competition and the move towards a more 
universal type o f banking, offering an array o f services, Caribbean financial institutions 
have become more amenable to accepting capital and expertise from other regional 
institutions in order to enhance their competitiveness and profitability. This has led to a 
number o f mergers and acquisitions in the regional financial sector in recent times.
Similar to Europe and North America, mergers and acquisitions in the Caribbean 
have been driven by the goal o f firms to achieve economies o f scale and scope, to 
increase market share and power and to strengthen competitiveness to ensure the 
longevity o f the institutions. Undoubtedly, the overarching processes o f globalisation 
and liberalisation have provided significant impetus to mergers and acquisitions. The 
rapid spread o f information that has resulted from globalisation has allowed regional 
firms to learn from experiences o f firms in foreign countries. This has led to the 
adaptation o f some o f the practices o f financial institutions in Europe and North America 
to the Caribbean setting. These include universal banking, involving commercial 
banking, investment and other financial services, bancassurance that entails banking and 
insurance services in the same banking institution and other such services. Also, as 
shareholders have become more sophisticated and have demanded better returns on 
equity, financial institutions used mergers as a vehicle for improving return on assets.18
18 See Harewood, Ainsworth, “Opening Remarks,” in “Mergers and Acquisitions in the Caribbean 
Financial Sector,” CCMS, 1997.
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The experiences o f individual Caribbean countries with mergers and acquisitions 
in the banking sector display certain broad similarities and also differences based on 
peculiar characteristics o f countries. The similarities relate largely to motivations for 
mergers, which were generally reactions to increased competition and the fear o f being 
overrun by foreign mega-financial institutions and the quest for improved economies of 
scale and reductions in operating costs. On the other hand, differences relate to the mode 
of the merger process in individual countries and the success o f the process in terms o f  
the attainment o f objectives.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the merger o f three indigenous banks, namely the 
Workers Bank, the Trinidad Cooperative Bank and the National Commercial Bank, to 
form the First Citizens Bank in 1993 provided a major impetus to mergers and 
acquisitions. Previously, these indigenous banks which advocated a more developmental 
role took greater risks in lending to sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing, that 
led to relatively high loan delinquency ratios. The merger was, therefore, aimed at 
enhancing their viability by operations that were on strict commercial terms. This 
underscores the delicate tradeoff that is often required in the Caribbean between strict 
commercial operations and development credit to small indigenous business, for instance. 
In keeping with the movement towards universal banking, a commercial bank, the Royal 
Bank o f Trinidad and Tobago, acquired a significant shareholding in the insurance 
company, Guardian Life, to provide “bancassurance”. Similarly, Colonial Life Insurance 
Company (CLICO) secured a major stake in the shareholding o f Republic Bank of 
Trinidad and Tobago. While bancassurance can provide a larger pool o f investment 
funds, it holds certain risks since insurance funds provide cover against risks, and are not 
strictly investment funds. Also, banks could be negatively affected by unsecured 
connected lending. Therefore, investment decisions using insurance premiums need to be 
matched by strongly prudential and regulatory safeguards.
In recent years, financial institutions from Trinidad and Tobago, having achieved 
critical mass in the local market have moved to acquire a number o f firms on the regional 
market. To a large extent, this reflects limited scope for organic growth in the domestic 
market and weaknesses in some regional financial institutions that made them prone to 
takeover bids. The Royal Bank o f Trinidad and Tobago, for example, had branch 
operations in over 10 Caribbean countries by 1999. The Royal Bank has fully acquired 
(100 per cent shareholding) o f a number o f banks in these countries. Indeed, the total 
assets o f the Royal Bank o f Trinidad and Tobago in the Eastern Caribbean in 1999 were 
over EC$702 million. In fact in its quest for geographic and portfolio diversification in 
the region, the bank has become a “regional multinational” corporation. Republic Bank 
of Trinidad and Tobago has also become a transregional corporation with branches in a 
number o f Caribbean countries.
Mergers and acquisition activity in Jamaica has reflected financial sector 
performance and susceptibility to leveraged buyouts. In 1996, there was a merger 
between the National Commercial Bank and the Mutual Security Bank. This involved 
the exchange o f share and assets o f about J$400 million. Although this was an amicable
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merger, Jamaica was to experience a number o f relatively hostile takeovers in the wake 
of the financial crisis that occasioned the formation o f FINSAC in 1997. Further, a 
number o f banks, including Citizens Bank Limited, Eagle Commercial Bank and 
Workers Saving and Loan Bank, among others, were merged to form Union Bank o f  
Jamaica in 1999, with assets o f over J$25.9 billion. Union Bank was acquired by the 
Royal Bank o f Trinidad and Tobago in 2001.
The proposed merger o f the Caribbean operations o f Barclays Bank and the 
Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce (CIBC), to be based in Barbados, should be of 
considerable interest for the region. The merger which is likely to be approved by 
regulators, will create a new institution - First Caribbean International Bank (FCI) with 
total assets o f US$9.9 billion. This will make it the largest financial institution in the 
Caribbean. Both Barclays and CIBC will each have a 45 per cent shareholding in FCI, 
with the remaining 10 per cent allocated for institutional and individual investors. FCI is 
expected to have branches in 15 Caribbean countries, making it one o f the largest branch 
banks in the region. As noted by one regional politician, it was unfortunate that the 
regional indigenous banks did not lobby harder to be get a stake in the merger. This 
could have made available to them the technical, financial and managerial expertise of 
these well-established banks and contributed substantially to the performance and 
competitiveness o f the regional indigenous banks. However, this merger needs to be 
viewed with caution because o f its implications for concentration in the banking sector 
and its potential adverse impact on competition and consumer welfare. This might be 
offset to some extent by economies o f scale and scope and reduced operating costs, part 
of which could be transferred to customers as lower administrative and interest charges. 
Notwithstanding this, indigenous banks that will have to face greater competition will 
face increased competition and will have to restructure their operations to survive. Other 
smaller mergers include the acquisition o f NBIC in Guyana and NCB Grenada by 
Republic Bank o f Trinidad and Tobago and the acquisition o f the Grenada Bank of 
Commerce by Royal Bank o f Trinidad and Tobago.
VIII. Strengthening of prudential and regulatory standards
Economists have long noted the importance o f properly sequencing financial 
sector reform and liberalisation. The fairly well received view is that macroeconomic 
stability, in terms o f variables such as price, exchange rate and money supply growth, and 
fiscal reform and consolidation, should precede the full-fledged liberalisation o f the 
capital account. Also, improved supervision and regulation should be put in place to 
prevent bank failures and adverse contagion in the financial sector. Unfortunately in a 
number o f Caribbean countries, including Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles and Trinidad 
and Tobago, improper sequencing o f reforms and regulation led to bank failures that 
impacted negatively on the financial sector for some time.
The Central Banks in most Caribbean countries undertake the regulation and 
supervision o f the financial system. In the OECS countries, however, the Ministries of 
Finance perform the regulatory function, while the regional central bank - the Eastern
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Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) - undertakes the supervision o f financial institutions. In 
most countries, supervision and regulation at the country level for the commercial banks 
is fairly adequate. The real problems relate to the non-bank or near bank institutions and 
harmonisation o f the regulatory framework at the regional level.
Liberalisation and privatisation in the banking sector have provided an incentive 
for the formation o f a number o f non-bank financial institutions seeking to take 
advantage o f the more liberal market environment. Important among these institutions 
are the finance companies, credit unions and building societies. Regulators have always 
tried to arrive at a harmonious balance between the need for adequate regulation o f these 
institutions, while ensuring that regulation does not act as a disincentive to business 
activity. However, the relatively low technical reserve requirements for these non-bank 
institutions compared with commercial banks put the former in an advantageous position 
and led to their rapid growth. This could lead to a serious case o f the moral hazard 
problem where weak regulation encourages non-bank institutions to engage in risky 
lending in real estate and other areas, leading to the collapse o f some o f these institutions. 
In fact, these forms o f high-risk lending practices that resulted in a number o f insolvent 
financial institutions contributed importantly to the Asian Crisis.
In spite o f liberalisation and privatisation in the financial sector in the region, a 
number o f outstanding reforms are required to strengthen the banking system. In the first 
place, the technical reserve requirements o f the non-bank institutions need to be the same 
as for commercial banks, thereby eliminating arbitrage in favour o f the non-banks. Some 
countries have moved in this direction, but the process in incomplete. In addition, the 
regulatory and supervisory systems for the non-bank financial institutions need to be 
properly upgraded, especially to monitor off-balance sheet liabilities that could lead to 
insolvency. All logic suggests that, like the commercial banks, these institutions should 
be regulated by the central banks, which already have reputable machinery in place to do 
the job. Further, there is need for greater coordination among the regulatory bodies. 
However, regulation must be flexible enough to cater to the special needs o f these 
institutions, especially given the fact that they cater to small depositors and enterprises 
that often do not have access to larger commercial banks.
At the wider regional level, there is a clear need to adequately provide for 
regulation that can be classified as a “regional public good.” Some progress has been 
made in this area, but much remains to be done. Importantly, most countries have 
adopted the Basle Committee Standards on regulation and prudential supervision o f the 
banking system. However, there is still need for harmonisation o f standards and systems 
in some areas. For example, most countries now classify loans as non-accrual loans once 
they are over 90 days due. However, there is a serious lack o f uniformity in the region in 
classifying loans as ‘doubtful’ or ‘lost.’ This is a major aberration since proper and 
timely loan loss provisioning is essential to the transparency o f banks’ balance sheets.
Fortunately, commercial banks in most countries o f the region now adhere to a 
number o f prudential regulations. These regulations are aimed at reducing systemic risks 
in the banking operations through capital adequacy requirements to prevent overexposure
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of banks. An important measure is the limits both on loans to a single borrower and 
concentration on a class o f customers. These mechanisms are complemented by 
minimum solvency standards, powers o f inspection and obligatory requirements to report 
annual income statements and balance sheets. Structural regulation measures are used to 
confine banks to banking activity and to prevent ventures into risky non-bank lending. 
This is crucial for maintaining the integrity and solvency o f the banking system. 
However, by imposing high entry standards, these measures could aggravate 
concentration in the industry.
In the wake o f the Asian Crisis, more pressure has been brought to bear on 
Caribbean financial institutions to maintain high regulatory standards. An important 
lesson from the crisis is the need to safeguard the banking system from short-term, 
speculative capital flows. Although the financial crisis in Jamaica was due to underlying, 
poor lending practices and weak regulation and not speculative capital flows, improved 
regulation and supervision are still vital. This requires higher standards o f disclosure of 
information on the banks’ true exposure to short-term international borrowing supported 
by enhanced macroeconomic management. Importantly, Jamaica has moved to 
strengthen prudential regulations, including the reporting o f loan losses and forensic 
audits.
Although not often discussed in the same vein as the domestic banking system, 
off-shore banking, which has grown in importance in the region, has serious implications 
for the domestic banking sector. Lax regulation o f off-shore banks could encourage 
money laundering and other unscrupulous practices that could taint both the off-shore and 
‘onshore’ banking industries. In fact, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Harmful Tax Competition Report has underscored the need for the 
region to tighten regulation o f its off-shore jurisdiction to avoid OECD retaliatory action. 
Although the OECD’s stance was somewhat harsh, in that tax competition is a world­
wide practice, the region needs to maintain the integrity o f its off-shore sector. The 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) has designed a number o f guidelines to 
combat money laundering and other malpractices in the off-shore financial services 
sector. For example, under the Money Laundering Prevention Act, a person who engages 
in a transaction that involves money or property that is the proceeds o f a crime is guilty 
of an offence and can be subjected to a minimum term of imprisonment.
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Privatisation was an important component o f the reforms that Caribbean countries 
undertook in the latter part o f the 1980s and 1990s to liberalise and open up their 
economies to competition and enhance competitiveness. Indeed, privatisation must 
always be assessed alongside other liberalisation measures, such as interest rate 
liberalisation, capital account liberalisation, prudential regulation and competition policy.
At the outset, the banking sector was a prime candidate for privatisation because 
of its important role in the economy and the perception that it was a cardinal market 
activity. As expected, the privatisation process became most widespread in countries 
such as Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, where State ownership of 
commercial banks and other financial institutions was most entrenched. An important 
example o f privatisation in the banking sector included the complete divestment o f the 
full 100 per cent o f the shares o f NCB Jamaica by 1993 through placements on the stock 
exchange. Other notable examples o f privatisation were the Guyana Bank for Trade and 
Industry and the National Commercial Bank in Trinidad and Tobago.
Generally, the privatisation o f financial institutions led to a significant 
improvement in performance. Therefore, from the standpoint o f improvements in price- 
based efficiency, privatisation seems to have been beneficial. Similarly, privatisation was 
also associated with product innovation in terms o f ATM machines, debit cards and 
improved customer service and convenience. One crucial drawback o f privatisation, 
however, has been increased concentration in the banking sector in some countries, such 
as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and possibly Barbados, with the expected merger of 
Barclays Bank and CIBC to form First Caribbean International which will be the largest 
bank in the region. Moreover, privatisation has done little to address microeconomic 
inefficiencies in the banking sector that lead to relatively high operating costs and wide 
interest rate spreads.
The recent spate o f mergers and acquisitions in the region has also increased the 
market power o f large banks. While this might enable these banks to benefit from 
important economies o f scale, reduced competition in the industry could adversely affect 
consumer welfare. Caribbean bankers have argued that regional mergers are essential to 
the survival o f indigenous banks in the wake o f international competition. Although this 
argument is legitimate, too great a concentration o f market power is equally 
disadvantageous. In light o f mergers and also to provide for a sound financial system 
generally, regulation and supervision mechanisms need to be strengthened and brought in 
line with the times.
In addition, privatisation and liberalisation have led to increased financial 
deepening in most countries where these processes were entrenched. This led to 
increased growth in the broad money to GDP. However, the evidence seems to point to 
joint causation, with money influencing economic growth and growth leading to greater 
accumulation o f monetary liabilities. Importantly, privatisation has not led to any
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significant change in the structure o f the banking system, with retail banking still 
predominating and weak credit allocation to vital sectors, such and agriculture and small 
industry. This stems in part from the inherent conservatism and risk aversion of 
commercial banks and the lack o f capability o f small entrepreneurs to develop proper 
formal projects to present to the banks. Fortunately some alternative financing 
mechanisms, including development finance institutions and small enterprise 
development agencies, have helped to fill the gap in small enterprise financing.
In general, privatisation should not been seen as a panacea for the weaknesses of 
the banking system, but must be strengthened by adequate regulation and institutional 
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Figure 10: GBTI -Guyana
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